Since the beginning of the 21st century, Chinese scholars of international relations have been dedicated to introducing, applying, and developing scientific methods, and have achieved remarkable progress. A statistical analysis of six representative journals in China’s International Relations from 2000 to 2024 shows that the overall use of scientific methods among the journals has been on the rise. However, due to their different orientations, the application of those methods varies to some extent. Although historical and descriptive approaches still take a dominant position, the disciplinary focus has shifted toward scientific methods. Influenced by both the historical research tradition in China and the mainstream international academic community, these articles display a strong selectivity in the use of scientific methods, with several noteworthy tendencies: qualitative research tends to overemphasize causal mechanisms; quantitative research sometimes falls into the pitfalls of methodological fetishism and verification bias; and mixed-methods research often overlooks the partial incompatibility between qualitative and quantitative approaches. Therefore, international relations research in China should balance the humanistic and the scientific, and the promotion of scientific methods should be pursued in moderation. Only in this way can China’s international relations research develop in a sustainable and rigorous manner.

With a prevailing assumption of China as a Westphalian territorial nation-state, the Chinese School of International Relations (IR) Theory has been understood primarily in essentially territorial and nationalist terms established by a Western construct. This framework fails to adequately accommodate elements representing “Chineseness,” such as China’s history, culture, and traditional philosophical thought, which are regarded as essential resources for developing Chinese IR theory. This largely unacknowledged paradox in the “Chinese School” endeavor may limit its potential to contribute to transforming the discipline and addressing global challenges. Drawing on scholarship that recalibrates “Chineseness” across a broader academia, this article reimagines international relations by proposing “Chinese-Global International Relations” (CGIR) as a new agenda for a transformative and anti-essentialist Chinese IR theory. CGIR emphasizes the global nature of Chinese IR, asserting that there is no singular origin of “Chineseness,” and advocates for the Chinese School to be based on cultural rather than national identity. In doing so, CGIR distinguishes itself from the nationalist formulation of “Chinese IR” as well as the all-inclusive project of Global IR that has suffered from globalism. It demonstrates how a relational re-articulation of “Chineseness” can save Chinese IR from Chinese exceptionalism, the Western-Chinese dichotomy, the universality-locality dilemma, and globalism, while opening up new possibilities for theoretical innovation in Global IR.

Technology diffusion not only enhances the technological capabilities of late-developing countries and firms, but also serves as a vital driver of global innovation and economic development. However, a complex interplay of political and economic factors has led to the slow pace of international technology diffusion, especially in the case of high-end technologies and diffusion toward developing countries. From the perspective of exporting states, developed countries often seek to prevent the spread of critical technologies that may threaten their national security, industrial advantages, international status, or generate domestic political and fiscal pressures. They employ measures such as export controls, investment reviews and restrictions, intellectual property protection, and the formation of international technology alliances to impede diffusion. From the perspective of recipient countries, factors such as weak absorptive capacity, concerns over technological sovereignty and politico-economic security, and the influence of domestic interest groups may also lead to reluctance or inability to adopt and utilize advanced technologies. In the long run, the lack of willingness among technology providers and the limited absorption capabilities of recipients can reinforce each other, creating a vicious cycle that further hinders the global diffusion of technology.

Since the first term of the Trump administration, the United States has fundamentally shifted its approach and adopted a “whole-of-government” strategy for competition with China. Both the executive and legislative branches have established China-related institutions such as China Mission Center, China Task Force, China Working Group, and Office of China Coordination. These institutions serve three types of function: policy coordination, issue-specific action, and strategic planning and legislative initiatives. Operating through inter-agency or working group mechanisms, they aim to manage affairs in key areas of strategic competition against China and enhance U.S. competitive advantages. The proliferation of such institutions has, however, introduced several challenges. These include the risk of “group myth” in strategic competition, contradiction between strengthening the intensity of competition and controlling the degree of competition, limited practical effect, unstable organizational continuity, and the tendency toward over-securitization. The Trump administration is attempting to dismantle the “deep state” and pursuing reforms of the federal bureaucracy. The current landscape of China-related institutions, characterized by overlapping agendas, bloated staffing, and bureaucratic redundancy, runs counter to this goal of streamlining. As a result, institutional reform efforts are likely to face significant resistance and may introduce further uncertainty into Sino-US relations.

The concept dongyang or tōyō was initially an obscure geographical term in both Chinese and Japanese, denoting the sea areas to the east of the Chinese mainland. In the 1880s, it became popular in Japan as a primary term for “Asia,” with a similar usage subsequently appearing in Chinese. This transformation was not a simple product of importing Western concepts, but rather a result of conscious local creation and adaptation by Chinese and Japanese intellectuals based on their respective domestic needs. In Japan, various sectors of society utilized the term to name new magazines, social organizations, and political parties. A leading Japanese academic figure, Inoue Tetsujirō, used it to reframe Asian intellectual traditions. Concurrently, in China, influential figures such as Huang Zunxian, Liang Qichao, and Sun Yat-sen strategically switched between the old and new meanings of the word as a political instrument to seek cooperation with Japan against Western powers. This transformation of tōyō/dongyang thus underscores the deep involvement and creativity of local actors in the process of knowledge construction in modern Asia.