In global governance, the relationship between the United Nations (UN) and non?governmental organizations (NGOs) has evolved from a vertical, consultative arrangement to more flexible, inclusive, and pluralistic partnership models. Shifting power logic, institutional logic, and capacity logic have shaped the trajectory of this transformation and the patterns of cooperation among actors. Although UN-NGO cooperation has expanded from a singular structural mode toward more relational and normative forms, persistent challenges remain in terms of representation, efficiency, and accountability, underscoring the need to better coordinate the three logics to enhance governance effectiveness. As an emerging governance approach, collaborative governance has demonstrated advantages in coordination and mobilization within global climate governance practices. Focusing on UN-NGO interactions within the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), this study shows that collaborative governance has facilitated the integration of the three logics through institutional innovation, soft governance mechanisms, and network-based coordination. Adjusting and optimizing institutional pathways thus constitutes a critical entry point for achieving stable and effective cooperation between the United Nations and NGOs.

As countries commit to achieving zero-carbon targets, just transition has become a core agenda in global climate governance. This analysis reveals that the issue has evolved profoundly from a technical solution with a focus on domestic labor transition to a comprehensive global agenda integrating both technical and political logics. The decision at COP 27 in 2022 to establish a stand-alone work program on just transition pathways marked a critical turning point, expanding its scope to energy, socio-economic dimensions, and other areas, and explicitly anchoring it under the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. This fundamentally altered the nature and scope of the issue, triggering intense contestation between developed and developing countries. Developed countries prefer limiting the agenda to technical knowledge-sharing to avoid new financial obligations, while developing countries emphasize its nature as an issue of international cooperation, demanding the establishment of a cooperation mechanism with substantive financial and technological support to reflect climate justice. Moving forward, promoting just transition from political contestation to practical cooperation is crucial for fulfilling global climate and sustainable development goals.

As an emerging norm in global environmental governance, “Nature-based Solutions” (NbS) faces internalization challenges despite its rapid institutionalization. Research indicates that NbS is often narrowly framed as a functional technical tool in policy documents, lacks cross-sectoral coordination and a unified global monitoring and accountability mechanism, and has given rise to a paradoxical situation where the Global South acts as the “main practitioner” yet remains in a position of “normative subordination.” Compared to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which have established a robust value consensus, the normative evolution of NbS is characterized by insufficient moral leadership, a lack of openness in institutional processes, and the marginalization of the Global South in norm construction. China now stands at a critical juncture to transition from a “norm internalizer” to a “norm shaper.” As a complementary analytical framework, the concept of “Civilization-based Solutions” (CbS) aims to infuse NbS with a civilizational dimension, elevating governance objectives from “utilizing nature” to “harmonious coexistence with nature.” The CbS framework and the global dialogue practices it fosters not only offer a novel perspective for analyzing the internalization dilemmas of existing norms but also provide an innovative research pathway for exploring more inclusive and effective global governance norms.

In recent years, traditional creditors and international organizations have been pressuring China to provide sovereign debt relief to developing countries. Analyzing how industrialized countries represented by the United States and three international organizations—the International Monetary Fund, the Paris Club, and the World Bank—responded to the wave of debt restructurings since the 1980s, this paper finds that when market-based approaches solely could not resolve debt problems, traditional creditors turned to government-supported debt reduction, exemplified by the Brady Plan; international organizations likewise moved from opposing debt reduction to launching schemes such as the Toronto Terms and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, while establishing rules to constrain free-riding. Two factors underpinned this transformation: first, the bargaining between creditor-country governments and financial institutions, and second, the institutionalization of debt relief mechanisms by various creditors to overcome collective action problems. Global sovereign debt governance, therefore, has not been entirely market-based, but instead reflects growing government engagement.

Following the terrorist attacks launched by Hamas in 2023, Israel rapidly initiated large-scale military operations in the Gaza Strip with the declared objective of eliminating Hamas. The ensuing military campaign led to a rising number of civilian casualties and a worsening humanitarian crisis. These developments exerted growing pressure on U.S. domestic politics during an election year, adversely affected the Democratic Party’s electoral prospects, and undermined the Biden administration’s efforts to advance its “New Middle East Strategy.” From February 2024, to ease domestic public opinion pressure while mitigating the negative impact on its regional strategy, the Biden administration sought to restrain Israel’s military operations in Gaza through various U.S.-Israel institutional consultation mechanisms, issuing warnings and exerting pressure, while also adopting punitive measures in the areas of arms supply and diplomacy. However, these efforts failed to produce tangible results, as Israel continued its military campaign in Gaza. This article argues that the Biden administration’s restraint of Israel constitutes a failed attempt at alliance restraint. The failure stems from inadequate enforcement capacity, but more fundamentally, it reflects a lack of genuine political will. In the view of U.S. strategic circles, Israel’s military operation in Gaza serves the advancement of top-priority objectives on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. President Trump, who returned to the White House in January 2025, did not consider constraining Israel’s Gaza operations as a policy option for addressing the Gaza crisis. Since there exist some differences between U.S. and Israel on some governance issues in post-conflict Gaza, it is still possible for Trump 2.0 to apply “alliance restraint” to U.S. policy towards Israel.