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DALEI JIE

Abstract: This article explains the rise and fall of the so-called Taiwan independence policy during the period of 1988–2010. It defines the Taiwan independence policy as an internal political move by the Taiwanese government to establish Taiwan as a separate and sovereign political entity on the world stage. It reviews two existing prevailing theses – electoral politics and shifting identity – and points out their weaknesses, the former’s being its indeterminacy and unfalsifiability, and the latter’s being its inadequacy to explain policy change. A new explanation focusing on relative power shift (military balance, alliance strength, and diplomatic standing) and domestic constraints (resource and political constraints) is then proposed to explain the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy. A brief examination of the 1988–2010 cross-strait history lends strong support to the theory.

Historical Overview: Taiwan’s Policies 1988–2010

What Is the Taiwan Independence Policy?

The “Taiwan independence policy” is defined as internal political moves by the Taiwanese government to establish Taiwan as a separate and sovereign political entity on the world stage, either in the form of sovereignty assertion, redefinition of the nature of cross-strait relations, or institutional reform. It is worth noting that whether the ultimate goal of a political move is *de jure* Taiwan independence or not, as long as it enhances Taiwan’s sovereign status, it is encapsulated under the name of “Taiwan independence policy.” In other words, my usage of the “Taiwan independence policy” is agonistic on its ideological underpinnings. To gauge and measure the rise and fall of Taiwan independence policy, I use the term “sovereignty assertiveness” (i.e., the extent to which the Taiwanese government seeks and claims a separate sovereignty). Specifically, three aspects will be examined: self-claim and self-definition of Taiwan’s sovereign status and cross-strait relations, long-term commitment to unification, and sovereignty-implicated institutional changes. Below is a brief account of the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy (i.e., the degree of sovereignty assertiveness).

The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan Independence Policy

*From One China to One China with Adjectives (1988–94).* When Lee Teng-hui assumed the presidency upon Chiang Ching-kuo’s death in 1988, the official line of the Republic of China (ROC) was that reunification has to occur under the Three Principles of the People, the Kuomintang’s (KMT) founding ideology. On the matter of cross-strait exchange, it was the Three No’s policy: no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise. Lee Teng-hui vowed to carry on these policies and fulfill the mission of unification for the Chinese nation. He emphasized that both Taiwan and the mainland are an “indivisible part of China” and all Chinese were “compatriots of the same flesh and blood” and should therefore work together to achieve the common goal of national unification through peaceful and democratic means. What parts Lee from his predecessors were his attitudes toward Beijing; he terminated the “period of national mobilization for the suppression of communist rebellion” and abolished the “temporary provisions” of the Constitution in 1991, thus shifting the ROC’s longstanding position that Beijing was a “rebel regime” to one that regarded Beijing as a (legitimate) “political entity” ruling the mainland area.

Meanwhile, institutional structures were also established to direct, supervise, and implement mainland policies. In particular the National Unification Council (NUC) was established and passed the National Unification Guidelines (NUG) in February 1991. The NUG envisioned a three-phased unification process: exchanges and reciprocity (short term), mutual trust and cooperation (medium term), and consultation and unification (long term). Negotiations across the Strait were held since the end of
1991 between the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), a semiofficial body, and its mainland counterpart, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). Under the auspices of the so-called “1992 consensus” – one China, different interpretations – the cross-strait interaction culminated in a historic meeting between the two heads of the SEF and ARATS in Singapore in April 1993 and its four agreements.

After 1993, there was a perceptible change in Taipei’s characterization of cross-strait relations. “One China policy with adjectives” is perhaps the best term for it (i.e., Lee and other political leaders tended to add certain qualifications to the “one China policy” so as to highlight the ROC’s sovereignty and equality with the People’s Republic of China [PRC]). For example, Chiang Ping-kun, the ROC’s economic minister, told the press at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Seattle in 1993 that the government policy was a “one-China-oriented two-China policy over a certain period of time.” In other words, one China is the future, two Chinas are the present. In April 1994, Lee stated that “the current stage is that ‘the ROC is on Taiwan’ and ‘the PRC is on the mainland.’ We should forget words like one China, two Chinas . . .”

Despite these rhetoric changes, Taipei’s policy was still firmly confined to the one China framework, its commitment to ultimate unification remained strong, and the institutionalized cross-strait interaction was moving forward.

From One Divided China to Special State-to-State Theory (1995–99). The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis effectively ended the conciliatory interaction across the strait. In the aftermath of the crisis, although Taipei did not abandon the one China policy, it grew more skeptical of it and frequently referred to “one China” as a “political trap” for Taiwan. In February 1997, the Government Information Office even warned that if the PRC’s “one China principle” was accepted, it amounted to a “verbal annexation” of the ROC, and it was thus better to talk about “one divided China” than simply “one China.” In 1998, the SEF and ARATS resumed talks, and during the meeting between the two heads, Koo Chen-fu, the SEF president, stressed once again that “one divided China” was not only a historical fact, but also a political reality.

It was Lee Teng-hui himself who redefined the nature of cross-strait relations in a revolutionary way. On July 9, 1999, Lee proclaimed that since the ROC’s constitutional reform in 1991, cross-strait relations are “nation-to-nation, or at least as special state-to-state ties, rather than internal ties within ‘one China’ between a legitimate government and a rebellion group, or between central and local governments.” The new formulation was seen by many as formally scrapping the one China policy, and it dashed any hope of further cross-strait dialogue during Lee’s presidency. In short, the 1995–99 years witnessed a medium rise of sovereignty assertiveness, as Taiwanese leaders were more skeptical and critical of one China, commitment to unification turned shaky, and institutionalized cross-strait interaction stalled.

Chen’s Initial Moderation (2000–01). The 2000 presidential election brought Chen Shui-bian, the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to the presidency, marking the first transfer of power to the opposition after five decades of the KMT rule. Notwithstanding the long-term advocate of Taiwan independence, initially Chen and the DPP approached cross-strait relations with considerable moderation and
conciliation. Chen’s inaugural address on May 20, 2000, not only emphasized the same “ancestral, cultural, and historical background” across the strait and did not rule out the possibility of future unification, but it also pledged the “Five No’s”: no declaration of independence, no change of the national title, no inclusion of the “state-to-state-theory” into the constitution, no referendum on independence, and no abolition of the NUC and NUG.

Chen’s subsequent statements and policies in the first two years of his reign by and large kept the moderate tone, and in 2001, his New Year messages went far beyond the DPP’s traditional radicalism on Taiwan independence by suggesting the possibility of “political integration” across the strait. Meanwhile, the Chen administration authorized the so-called “three mini-links” between the two offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu and the Chinese mainland in January 2001. Taken together, although Chen’s 2000–01 approach was not comparable to that of the early 1990s in terms of commitment to unification or acceptance of the “1992 consensus,” it was a significant retreat from the late Lee Teng-hui years, and given the initial pessimistic expectations of Chen’s handling of cross-strait relations, it could be reasonably categorized as a period of low sovereignty assertiveness.

From One-Country-on-Each-Side on (2002–07). Chen’s initial moderate approach proved to be transient and the “one-country-on-each-side theory” was clearly a watershed. When addressing a group of overseas Taiwanese supporters on August 3, 2002, Chen claimed that “Taiwan and China are standing on opposite sides of the strait; there is one country on each side.” The new formulation was arguably more sovereignty-assertive than Lee’s “special state-to-state theory,” and it was followed by a series of moves that were deemed by Beijing as “creeping independence,” salami tactics to achieve formal independence. In September 2003, Chen proposed a new constitution to be completed by 2006 to make Taiwan “a normal, complete and great country.” Later that year Chen announced that a “defensive referendum” would be held alongside the presidential election in March 2004, which not only raised the alarm for Beijing but also drew strong opposition from Washington.

Chen won his second term by a razor-thin margin and made a fairly conciliatory inaugural speech on May 20, 2004, but he soon resorted back to tactics with high sovereignty assertiveness. He continued to press on the “constitutional reengineering project” and called for a “bottom-up, outside-in” process, which was prone to radical independence-oriented drafts. In February 2006, one significant institutional change took place when Chen announced that the NUC would “cease to function” and the NUG would “cease to apply,” thus further weakening Taipei’s already tenuous commitment to unification. Furthermore, Chen indicated that Taiwan should apply for the UN membership under the name of “Taiwan” instead of its official title, the ROC, and later on, he announced that he would hold another referendum on this issue in tandem with the presidential election in early 2008. In short, on all three fronts – definition of Taiwan’s status, commitment to unification, and institutional changes – the years of 2002–07 were the most sovereignty-assertive.

Enter Ma Ying-jeou (2008–09). The KMT won a landslide victory during the presidential election in May 2008, and the coming into power of Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT
candidate, abruptly ended the high sovereignty-assertive era of his predecessor. During his inaugural address, Ma reiterated the “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” campaign platform and promised to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait “under the framework of the ROC Constitution.” He also called for the resumption of cross-strait negotiations based on the “1992 consensus” and proposed a “truce” in both cross-strait and international arenas. Ma also distanced himself from his predecessors by defining the cross-strait relationship as a special one and denied that it was one between two countries. Meanwhile, the SEF and ARATS quickly resumed dialogue after a hiatus of nine years. Agreements have been signed on a wide range of issues such as trade, transportation, tourism, travel, finance and investment, crime control, food safety, etc., and the “three links” were finally realized between the mainland and Taiwan. Moreover, a cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement was signed in 2010, and there were calls to sign a “peace agreement” between the two sides. The Ma Ying-jeou era is thus characterized by distinctively low sovereignty assertiveness, the extent to which had never been seen since the mid-1990s. Table 1 summarizes the evolution of the degree of sovereignty assertiveness from 1988 to 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sovereignty Assertion</th>
<th>Long-Term Commitment to Unification</th>
<th>Sovereignty-Implicated Institutional Changes</th>
<th>SOVEREIGNTY ASSERTIVENESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988–94</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–99</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–01</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002–07</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008–09</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alternative Explanations: Electoral Politics and Shifting Identity
There are not many systematic and theoretically informed studies on Taiwan’s external relations, including its policies toward mainland China. A prominent Taiwanese political scientist Yu-shan Wu lamented, “... the high attention cast on cross-strait relations has not translated into fertile theorization. Detailed description of events and preoccupation with current policies preclude detached observation and comparative understanding. We are short of theoretical frameworks with which to approach Taipei-Beijing relations.” Among existing studies, one can identify two most salient theses when it comes to explaining the Taiwan independence policy: electoral politics and shifting identity.

Electoral Politics
Domestic politics have attracted considerable scholarly attention in the study of Taiwan’s mainland and security policies. Scholars focused on “median voter position,” domestic political changes and cross-strait negotiations, the converging effects of elections on the mainland policy, and the domestic political economy of Taiwan’s mainland economic policies. Indeed, one scholar went so far as to claim that
“the most important factors that determine whether there is war or peace between the PRC and Taiwan are the domestic politics of the two sides.”19 The discussion of domestic politics has mostly focused on electoral politics. However, on the important question of whether electoral politics is a moderating or radicalizing factor on the issue of Taiwan independence (i.e., whether electoral politics contributes to more or less sovereignty assertiveness), opinions are divided.

On the one hand, it was argued that because the popular preference in Taiwan on issues related to the mainland policy – unification versus independence and economic interests versus security interests – is a normal distribution and the mainstream public opinion is maintaining the status quo, major political parties, despite their prior opposing stances, tended to converge toward the center for the purpose of vote maximization.20 On the other hand, other studies show that the approaching presidential and legislative elections increased the probability of more hostile and provocative words and deeds against mainland China.21 Wu’s arguments seem to be supported by the 2000 presidential election, while Lin and Kuan’s findings find evidence in the 2004 election, when political parties, instead of converging toward “maintaining the status quo,” became much more sovereignty-assertive on the issues of national referendum and a new constitution. For the 1996, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections, there are arguably no clear convergences on either moderation or assertiveness. The electoral politics theory of Taiwan’s independence policy is thus indeterminate: Electoral politics could moderate as well as radicalize the Taiwan independence policy.22 This is actually in line with other general findings that domestic elections do not have a consistent effect on a country’s foreign policy conciliation or belligerence.23

Secondly, the high frequency of Taiwan’s elections, which can be seen in Table 2, makes the argument that “elections matter for Taiwan’s mainland policy” largely unfalsifiable. Elections “occur not once a year in Taiwan but often twice a year because local and national, legislative, and executive terms of office are not conterminous and each kind of office has its own election day.”24 Even if one considers local elections to be less concerned with national policies such as the mainland policy and leaves them out, still “the density of elections with national scope or significance is striking.”25 In one sense, the high frequency makes elections in Taiwan a “constant” and gives birth to “perpetual campaign,”26 thus ill-suited to explain the sometimes drastic change of the Taiwan independence policy.

There is no pretense that electoral politics or other dimensions of domestic politics are irrelevant to Taiwan’s mainland policy. Indeed, they are undoubtedly integral to an understanding of Taiwan’s mainland policies and external relations, but the divisive nature of the national identity issue, highly visible domestic wrangling of the direction of mainland policies, and frequent electoral campaigns make it look as if domestic politics were the most determinate factor in explaining the Taiwan independence policy. However, the indeterminacy and unfalsifiability of the electoral politics approach made it hard to answer how and when it matters. To some extent, this is a level-of-generality question: Domestic politics is better at generating situation-specific arguments but less useful in offering generalizable explanations to the broader, long time-span question set out in the beginning of the article – the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy during the last 20 years.
## Table 2

**ELECTORAL DENSITY IN TAIWAN DURING 1991–2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Level</th>
<th>Direct-Controlled Municipalities</th>
<th>Counties, Provincial Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2nd National Assembly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2nd Legislative Yuan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1st Taiwan governor, 10th</td>
<td>12th county magistrate/city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>provincial assembly 1st</td>
<td>mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>municipal mayoral,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7/4 city council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3rd Legislative Yuan</td>
<td>13th county council/city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>9th Presidential &amp; 3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4th Legislative Yuan</td>
<td>13th county magistrate/city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2nd municipal mayoral,</td>
<td>mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8/5 city council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>10th Presidential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5th Legislative Yuan</td>
<td>14th county council/city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3rd municipal mayor,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/6 city council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11th Presidential, 6th</td>
<td>15th county council/city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Legislative Yuan</td>
<td>16th county council/city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Ad hoc National Assembly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4th municipal mayoral,</td>
<td>15th county magistrate/city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10/7 city council</td>
<td>mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7th Legislative Yuan; 12th</td>
<td>16th county magistrate/city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5/1 municipal mayor,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11/1 city council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Shifting Identity

The shifting identity thesis postulates that if more and more Taiwanese self-identify themselves only as Taiwanese rather than Chinese and believe Taiwan to be a nascent nation-state distinct from China, popular support for Taiwan’s legal independence would rise and consequently Taiwan’s mainland policy would become more sovereignty-assertive. Conversely, if the rise of Taiwanese identity is reversed and Chinese identity makes its way back, popular demands for Taiwan independence would fall and its mainland policy would be more conciliatory. Many believed that the issue of national identity and identity politics in Taiwan is “the dominant factor affecting Taiwan’s mainland China policy” and carries serious implications of the peace and stability in East Asia.27 Some analysts are rather pessimistic given the “inexorable” rise of the Taiwanese identity and nationalism.28

There are two dimensions of the identity issue in Taiwan: One is ethnic consciousness (measured as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both), and the other is policy preference (unification, independence, or status quo).29 Neither of these dimensions is sufficient to explain the Taiwan independence policy. First of all, although exclusive Taiwanese consciousness/identity has risen significantly at the expense of Chinese consciousness/identity, the
political attitudes on the independence–unification issue are quite stable and do not reflect a strong preference for the former. In fact, status quo-oriented pragmatists always account for about half of the respondents. It is hard to reconcile the relatively static nature of the Taiwanese political attitudes and the majority’s status quo preference with the sometimes dramatic rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy.

Secondly, in terms of Taiwanese consciousness and the independence policy, there is at best some limited correlation. The correlation is strongly challenged by the fact that the Taiwanese consciousness grew noticeably after 2008 and for the first time those who self-identify as Taiwanese surpassed 50 percent, yet the Ma Ying-jeou government was able to keep a low-profile policy on sovereignty. Moreover, the effects of Taiwanese consciousness on Taiwan’s actual policies vis-à-vis mainland China are far from straightforward. As Wu Yu-shan noted, “the rapid nativization of ethnic consciousness is only partially reflected in positions on national identity and the independence/unification question, and its influence on concrete policy positions ... is even more limited ...”

Security, Sovereignty, and the Taiwan Independence Policy

Next, I will offer an alternative theory focusing on Taiwan’s external and internal constraints. I will start with one assumption and two propositions and proceed from there to distill my hypotheses.

Assumption
The fundamental goal of the Taiwanese government’s national security strategy is survival and security.

Proposition 1
Sovereignty assertion is one of the instruments for Taiwan to bolster its survival and security.

Proposition 2
Sovereignty assertion is more likely to be utilized when other means for survival and security, be them military, economic, or diplomatic, are not readily available.

As the assumption states, the fundamental goal of the Taiwanese government’s national security strategy should be no different from any other political entities on the world stage (i.e., preservation of its survival and security). For Taiwan, survival and security means both physical integrity and political autonomy. Note that the goal is nonpartisan and consistent with any future political arrangements between Taipei and Beijing. For Taiwan independence advocates, survival and security are certainly a prerequisite to realize their political ambitions; for unification supporters, survival and security are also indispensable to negotiate an acceptable political deal with Beijing. In other words, if there is one least common denominator between different political camps on the island, that is Taiwan’s survival and security.
Proposition 1 states that sovereignty assertion is one of the instruments for Taiwan to bolster its survival and security. This may sound counterintuitive or even fallacious because many believe that sovereignty assertion is unnecessarily provocative to Beijing and undermines rather than enhances Taiwan’s security. This logic has a great deal of truth, but the sovereignty–security nexus is much beyond what this line of reasoning implies. Sovereignty could undermine security, but it could also enhance it. Similar to other forms of statecraft, it is a double-edged sword. Specifically, sovereignty assertion contributes to Taiwan’s survival and security for two major reasons.

First of all, sovereignty is an instrument for survival. As Kalevi Holsti forcibly pointed out, sovereignty “is the critical component of the birth, maintenance, and death of states. Sovereignty helps create states; it helps maintain their integrity when under threat from within or without; and it helps guarantee their continuation and prevents their death.” In short, sovereignty “provides an essential ingredient for the security of any political community.”

For small and weak states with much less military, political, and economic clout, sovereignty rules are more instrumental and could be a matter of life and death. As the norm of sovereignty presupposes equality of all sovereigns, it to some extent neutralizes power asymmetries and is thus “far more constraining for powerful states and far more liberating for weak states.”

In the same vein, studies of survival strategies of small states conclude that the principle of sovereignty constitutes “the greatest nominal protection for the weak” and that the failure of attracting international attention by a small state would put it into peril.

The sovereignty–security connection is felt keenly in Taiwan. In fact, given the universalization and canonization of sovereignty and its associated norms and principles after the Second World War, an internationally recognized independent sovereign status for Taiwan (no matter what the formal title is) may serve as the best guarantor of its survival and security. To be sure, being a sovereign in no way precludes possibilities of falling victim to attack or coercion, but these forcible actions against a sovereign would be perceived as fundamentally illegitimate and prompt strong international reactions. As one scholar put it, “although sovereignty cannot guarantee that a state will remain in being, it can guard against the possibility of the state’s extinction: it can create problems for greater states when they try to impose their will on smaller ones . . .” So sovereignty is no magic bullet, but it does make a difference. For Taipei, the difference lies in whether the international community perceives Beijing’s coercion as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait or as Beijing’s repression of secessionists in Xinjiang or Tibet.

Second, sovereignty is bargaining chips with respect to political negotiations. So far, all negotiations that have been conducted and completed across the strait are so-called “functional” or “apolitical” ones regarding tourism, transportation, trade, investment, crime control, food safety, etc., and political negotiations on the political status of Taipei and future political arrangements between Taipei and Beijing seem to be beyond reach for the time being. Still, Taipei has to get ready for discussing political issues with Beijing. Just as states have to prepare for war during peacetime, they also have to come to the negotiation table with enough bargaining chips to avoid disastrous consequences. For Taipei, the consequences could be as grave as its very existence, because it is believed that Beijing’s goal is to “undermine” or even “destroy” Taiwan’s sovereign
Although many factors such as power asymmetry, domestic politics, external actors, and negotiation tactics would influence the trajectory and outcome of such negotiations, Taipei’s sovereign status ex ante is obviously crucial in determining its political status ex post.

For now, there is a great gulf between the two sides’ proposals regarding the forms of a future political union: Beijing’s “one country, two systems” proposal, which grants some sort of home rule for Taipei but denies it sovereignty, has no popular attraction in Taipei, while Taipei’s sporadic indicated preference for a European Union-like confederation with both Beijing and Taipei being equal, sovereign, and constituent parts of a larger China has been rejected by Beijing. If we put “one country, two systems” and confederation at two extremes along a continuum, the more established Taiwan’s sovereign status ex ante is, the more likely it is able to obtain favorable terms and move the final resolution toward its desired outcome. Moreover, Taipei could take advantage of its alleged sovereign status to fend off Beijing’s political offensive by accusing the latter’s proposal of downgrading its sovereignty.

In short, sovereign status is consequential for Taipei to withstand both military coercion and political offensive from Beijing. Skeptics would quickly point out that Taipei’s reckless pursuit of sovereignty is very provocative to Beijing and thus damaging to its most important goal of survival and security. This is certainly true. But we have to bear in mind that this is also the case with respect to other means of security seeking. To take one of the most classic types of security seeking – military buildup – as an example, it could also be potentially provocative and counterproductive. First of all, the ubiquity of security dilemma means that oftentimes a state’s military buildup for defensive purpose is interpreted as threatening in other capitals, triggering countermeasures and the action–reaction chain and arriving at a suboptimal outcome for everyone. The security dilemma presents itself in a particularly acute way in East Asia and across the Taiwan Strait, because even defensive capabilities acquired by Taiwan appear to be a “protection umbrella” for Taiwan’s separatist agenda and thus provocative to the PRC. Secondly, in the context of the Taiwan Strait, certain military options for Taiwan are highly provocative and even suicidal. This is why the United States refuses to sell offensive weapons to Taiwan and why the nuclear option is self-defeating for Taiwan as it almost ensures a preventive attack from the mainland.

In addition, other means of security seeking for Taiwan such as alliance building and pragmatic diplomacy are potentially explosive as well. In terms of alliance building, Beijing has made it clear that foreign military presence on the island is one of the conditions to prompt the use of force, while the climax of Taipei’s pragmatic diplomacy – Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 visit to the United States – precipitated the third Taiwan Strait crisis. So provocativeness does not differentiate various means of security seeking. Neither does effectiveness. All can be potentially effective to enhance Taiwan’s security, but none are failure-proof. As Table 3 shows, differences among security-seeking means come more out of form than substance: whether they are internal or external efforts and whether they rely on material (hard) or normative (soft) power. So the fundamental and thorny question for Taiwan’s decision makers is to balance the effectiveness and provocativeness of each different security-seeking means (i.e., to push it to the greatest extent possible without being unduly provocative). This is no easy matter, and it
suggests that the inherent difficulty in walking a fine line in a security dilemma situation is also existent in alliance building, pragmatic diplomacy, sovereignty assertion, etc.\textsuperscript{52}

The bottom line of the above discussion is not that sovereignty assertion is the most effective way of defending Taipei against Beijing’s military attack or political offensive but that given Taiwan’s political status, endeavors to acquire as many trappings as possible of a normal sovereign state are one of the many means of security seeking, just like military buildup, seeking alliances, economic diplomacy, and any other kinds of statecraft. It has its drawbacks, but so do other means. When its fundamental goal of survival and security is imperiled, Taiwan’s leaders simply have more incentive to resort to sovereignty assertion as one of its responses.

Proposition 2 states that sovereignty assertion becomes more likely when other means for survival and security are not readily available. This is because there are a variety of military, economic, and diplomatic instruments that are utilizable for security-seeking purposes, and sovereignty assertion is not necessarily the best choice due to its “soft” nature and Beijing’s hypersensitivity in that regard. However, sovereignty assertion does have one unique advantage: It is the least resource-consuming of all means, as under many circumstances, it entails no more than a few top officials’ policy pronouncements. In comparison, military modernization, alliance building, and pragmatic diplomacy all require substantial devotion and consumption of financial and human resources. Consequently, when domestic constraints make it difficult to mobilize sufficient resources, chances increase for sovereignty assertion.

There are two kinds of domestic constraints: resource constraints and political constraints. Resource constraints refer to the societal resources that a state has available to advance its strategic goals by building military forces and conducting diplomacy. But those resources are only “latent power,”\textsuperscript{53} and whether they can be expended and effectively turned into “actual power” also hinges upon domestic political context. Various domestic political configurations, such as elite fragmentation, regime vulnerability, administrative deficiency, prevailing ideology etc., can all affect whether, and distort how, political leaders can tap domestic resources for the purpose of national security.\textsuperscript{54} As Taiwan’s democratic transition gained momentum since the late 1980s and a series of constitutional amendments and institutional reform have been made, the security and foreign-policy decision-making no longer resides solely in the hands of a few top civilian and military leaders, and various political constraints have exerted increasing pressures on the government’s ability to initiate and implement preferred policies.

To summarize, sovereignty assertion is one instrument for survival and security, so it becomes more likely when Taiwan’s survival and security are imperiled due to

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<tr>
<td>Military buildup</td>
<td>Yes, to some extent</td>
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<td>Alliance building</td>
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<td>Pragmatic diplomacy\textsuperscript{87}</td>
<td>Yes, to some extent</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>External</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sovereignty assertion</td>
<td>Yes, to some extent</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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\textsuperscript{87} Propaganda and other forms of diplomacy.
Hypothesis 1
Sovereignty assertion is most likely (i.e., sovereignty assertiveness is the highest when power shift is adverse and domestic constraints are strong).

Hypothesis 2
Sovereignty assertion is least likely (i.e., sovereignty assertiveness is the lowest when power shift is favorable and domestic constraints are weak).

Hypothesis 3
Sovereignty assertion is medium (i.e., sovereignty assertiveness is medium when power shift is favorable and domestic constraints are strong or power shift is adverse and domestic constraints are weak).

A Congruence Test
The vicissitudes of cross-strait relations and rise and fall of Taiwan’s sovereignty assertiveness during the past two decades offer an excellent opportunity to test the above hypotheses. Next, I will use congruence method to examine if the independent and intervening variables – power shift and domestic constraints – covary as the hypotheses predict with sovereignty assertiveness, the dependent variable. Because the changes of sovereignty assertiveness have already been detailed in the first section, the focus here will be on power shift and domestic constraints. Power shift includes military balance, alliance strength,55 and diplomatic standing because all three dimensions have a strong bearing on Taiwan’s survival and security,56 while domestic constraints refer to both resource and political constraints.

The testing begins with the 1988–94 period, during which favorable power shift was perceptible for Taipei. First of all, in terms of military balance, Taipei enjoyed qualitative superiority in the most critical areas such as air defense, sea control, and antilanding capability despite being outmanned and outgunned. The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) substantial numerical advantage was offset by the limited air space and sea area.
of the Taiwan Strait and the unlikelihood of Beijing opting for a protracted total war. As a result, the PLA’s options of the use of force against Taiwan were quite constrained: Not only was amphibious assault out of the question, coercive measures such as naval blockade and missile campaign were also in serious doubt. A respected Taiwanese military analyst concluded that the PLA’s military actions against Taiwan would most likely be no more than what was displayed during the 1995–96 crisis, and the PLA’s own “after-action assessments” after the crisis acknowledged that the PLA capabilities against Taiwan were limited.

During the early 1990s, developments of US–Taiwan relations also seemed to bode well for Taiwan. A few momentous external and internal changes increased Taiwan’s relative strategic position and rendered the US government more willing than before to extend security and political support and challenge the straitjacket imposed on Washington–Taipei relations in the 1970s and 1980s. The most important change was of course the end of the Cold War and the evaporation of the strategic imperative for Washington to maintain the anti–Soviet alignment with Beijing, not infrequently at the expense of Taipei’s interests. Meanwhile, the 1989 Tiananmen crisis and crackdown, coupled with Taiwan’s “quiet revolution” in liberalizing and democratizing its erstwhile quasi-Leninist regime, offered the latter moral high ground in securing US domestic support. Lastly, Taiwan’s economic success and role as one of the US’s most important economic partners also explained its increasing appeal to the United States.

In terms of policy substance, the US security commitment, political support, and arms sales all witnessed favorable adjustments for Taipei. As for security commitment, the basics of the US policy set forth by the three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) remained steadfast, and strategic ambiguity still caught the essence of the US noncommitment/commitment, but the simple fact of growing US–China frictions, the US willingness to take the lead to intervene during the Gulf War, and some US officials’ occasional mentioning of the TRA’s primacy over communiqués tended to lead Taiwanese analysts to believe that the US security commitment was strengthened, if only marginally. In contrast, the US policy adjustments regarding political relations and arms sales were probably more noteworthy: Mutual visits by incumbent and former officials were marked by increasing frequency and higher level of seniority; the Taiwan Policy Review approved by the Clinton administration in 1994 introduced a series of small steps to upgrade bilateral relations; and the sale of 150 F-16s in 1992 essentially reversed a 10-year US policy of reining in arms sales to Taiwan, etc. Overall, Taiwan reasonably took comfort in these moderate yet noticeable US policy adjustments.

Furthermore, Taipei’s shift to pragmatic diplomacy and aggressive diplomatic endeavors paid off. During this period, Taipei increased the number of its formal diplomatic allies from 22 to 30 and obtained membership or observer status of a few more international organizations such as APEC and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The more significant and impressive achievements, however, lie in the realm of expansion of substantive relations with nondiplomatic allies, which were reflected in the upgrading of representative offices, expansion of their functions and privileges, proliferation of ministerial-level visits, and Taipei’s top officials’ widespread footprints in these countries. Southeast Asia, Western Europe, and even...
former Soviet bloc countries in Eastern Europe all became targets of Taipei’s effective pragmatic diplomacy, and its international “visibility” increased considerably. The fruitful pragmatic diplomacy, together with improved US–Taiwan relations and the Taiwanese military’s qualitative superiority, meant a favorable power shift and the most benign security environment ever since 1979.

Meanwhile, there were no strong domestic constraints on resource mobilization during this period. Four decades of sustained and rapid economic growth produced an affluent society and resource-abundant government. As of 1993, Taiwan ranked 20th in Gross National Product and stood as the 12th largest exporter, 15th largest importer, 9th largest foreign investor, and largest holder of foreign reserves. As a result Taiwan’s military modernization programs and diplomatic endeavors benefited enormously from the government’s resource abundance. In terms of political constraints, President Lee Teng-hui did face formidable challenges of his political power from the KMT conservatives, but he soon consolidated his power due to extraordinary political struggle skills, unusually high popularity, and effective use of the democratization process to weaken his rivals. More importantly, the political constraints Lee faced under his initial reign did not undermine his ability to mobilize resources for national security purposes because the KMT conservatives were in general supportive of beefing up Taiwan’s military and strengthening its diplomatic status. To summarize the 1988–94 period, Taiwan was double blessed in the sense that power shift was favorable and domestic constraints were weak. Given these conditions, the theory predicts low sovereignty assertiveness, and this was indeed the case.

In many aspects, the latter half of the 1990s after the 1995–96 crisis was a transitional period. There was an adverse power shift from Taipei’s perspective, but the shift was relatively mild. The crisis clearly influenced the PLA’s threat perceptions and transformed its potentially across-the-board military modernization program into one keenly focused on the Taiwan scenario. But as of the late 1990s, much of the desired capabilities still remained aspirational and one notable report by the Pentagon concluded in 1999 that there had yet been dramatic changes of the cross-strait military balance except in areas like China’s deployment of short-range ballistic missiles. However, it seemed to be only a matter of time before the military balance would tip in China’s favor and Taiwan’s “window of invulnerability” would close.

During this period, Taiwan had mixed feelings about the developments of US policy toward Taiwan. On the one hand, the revitalization of the US–Japan alliance in 1996–97, especially the new proclamation to cooperate “in areas surrounding Japan,” seemed to suggest the alliance’s greater concern about and potential role in the Taiwan scenario. Moreover, the Pentagon’s so-called “software initiative” with its Taiwanese counterpart elevated bilateral military relations beyond arms sales to the discussion of strategy, training, logistics, command and control, etc. On the other hand, Washington’s efforts to restore and improve relations with Beijing necessitated some concurrent adjustments of its political relations with Taipei, which culminated in President Clinton’s public endorsement of the “three no’s” policy in Shanghai in 1998. A few prominent US former and current officials’ call for cross-strait “interim agreement/s” also caused consternation in Taipei that the United States was impatient with the status quo and was pushing for political talks.
Moreover, as Taipei scored some diplomatic gains in the early 1990s and Beijing was alarmed, the latter started to mount an intensified campaign on the international stage to win the diplomatic tug of war. Taipei believed that Beijing’s goal was the “three zeros” – zero allies for Taiwan, zero international space for Taiwan, and zero bargaining chips for Taiwan – and that Beijing intended to reduce the number of Taiwan’s allies to zero before 2000. After Taipei lost South Africa in 1997, it had virtually no diplomatic allies with any international political significance. Overall, during the period of 1995–99 adverse power shift was taking place for Taipei, but the shift was relatively mild given that Beijing’s contingency-driven military modernization and diplomatic offensive were still in the early stage and the United States adopted a bifurcated Taiwan policy (i.e., political tilt toward Beijing accompanied by rising military relations with Taipei).

Domestic constraints were relatively weak during the late Lee Teng-hui years. Although the 1997 Asian financial crisis took a toll on Taiwan’s economy, the shock was limited compared with other Asian economies; budget deficit was brought under control; and Taiwan was still able to maintain a decent defense budget. Politically Lee Teng-hui’s stature reached its acme after the Cornell visit and his victory in the 1996 presidential election. Lee’s power was further expanded after the 1997 constitutional amendment mandated the presidential appointment of premier without legislative approval. In the legislature, the ruling KMT still enjoyed a comfortable majority. To summarize the 1995–99 period, Taiwan was confronted with a relatively mild adverse power shift, but domestic constraints were weak and sovereignty assertiveness rose to a limited extent.

During the period of 2002–07, power shift across the Taiwan Strait turned out to be even more adverse for Taiwan. In terms of military balance, the PLA coupled its traditional numerical advantage with qualitative advancement to present Chinese leaders with more credible means to conduct a variety of coercive campaigns against Taiwan and to deter, delay, and complicate the US intervention. In particular, a missile campaign and naval blockade became very effective coercive tools due to increasing lethality, accuracy, and size of the PLA’s ballistic missiles and land attack cruise missiles and expansion and upgrading of submarine forces and mine warfare capabilities. Meanwhile, the PLA’s emerging antiaccess/area-denial capability of keeping potential US intervention forces at bay started to seriously concern US military planners. Despite that an amphibious assault was still operationally challenging and politically risky, it was clear that through overseas acquisition and indigenous production of advanced weaponry and equipment, the PLA gradually gained the upper hand in the contest for military supremacy across the strait.

The US–Taiwan relations also took a downward turn during this period, with the Bush administration starting as “the most Taiwan-friendly administration since the termination of diplomatic relations (or since World War II)” but ending up “as probably the most hostile.” The US security commitment did not experience major changes and turned out to be the most stable aspect of the bilateral relationship, but political relations significantly deteriorated and arms sales unexpectedly became another area of friction. For a variety of institutional, economic, and political reasons, the Taiwanese government moved quite slowly to purchase the large arms sale package approved by
the Bush administration in April 2001. The United States interpreted the procrastination as Taipei’s lack of commitment of its own defense and attempt to free ride on Washington, while Taipei saw Washington’s impatience as arrogance and lack of appreciation of its democratic procedures. Furthermore, political relations were characterized by deep mutual distrust as Washington firmly believed that President Chen Shui-bian was bent on pursuing his domestic political agendas without regard to the US interests, and Taipei lamented that Washington ignored its vulnerable security situation and was instead willing to co-manage the Taiwan Strait with an increasingly menacing Beijing.

Meanwhile, Taipei’s international space continued to shrink under Chen Shui-bian’s reign. The number of its formal diplomatic allies decreased from 29 to 23 by the end of 2007, its substantive relations with Southeast Asia and Europe were completely overshadowed by Beijing’s rising economic and political influence and adroit diplomacy in these regions, and its participation in international organizations stagnated. Although relations with Japan made some headway, it could not compensate for the overall worsening diplomatic standing for Taipei. Thus, all three dimensions of power shift – military balance, alliance strength, and diplomatic standing – witnessed adverse developments, and the period of 2002–07 was unmistakably the most perilous for Taipei to maintain its survival and security.

As Taipei’s security environment deteriorated, strong domestic constraints made it rather difficult to mobilize sufficient resources in response. Sluggish economic growth rate, a swollen government budget deficit, and a changing government expenditure structure favoring social security programs meant that the government faced unprecedented resource constraints for national defense and foreign affairs to begin with. Moreover, strong political constraints exacerbated the mobilization problem. Throughout the Chen Shui-bian presidency, an executive–legislative impasse was on full display due to flawed institutional design, a divided government, and a hypercompetitive political atmosphere, and the opposition’s quintessential obstructionist tactics crippled the Chen government’s ability to take policy initiatives. Chen himself was further politically weakened after a series of scandals involving his family members and close aides were exposed in 2006 and his popularity plummeted. These political constraints further tightened the straitjacket already imposed by resource constraints. To summarize the 2002–07 period, power shift was adverse and domestic constraints were strong, and Taipei seemed to be left with no other alternatives but to resort to high sovereignty assertiveness.

The first couple of years of the Chen Shui-bian era (2000–01) witnessed a brief conciliatory period characterized by low sovereignty assertiveness. Chen’s initial moderation on sovereignty cannot be fully explained by the proposed theory, because there was neither a clear favorable power shift nor enhanced domestic mobilizational capacity. Rather, the moderation seemed to stem in large part from his eagerness to open dialogue with Beijing and his personal ambition of becoming “Taiwan’s Nixon.” This reflects the inevitable lacuna of the kind of macro-theory that focuses on external and internal constraints but leaves out individual-level factors. Indeed, individual-level political leadership is sometimes crucial to our understanding of human history, and although external and internal constraints may incentivize political leaders to act in certain ways,
sheer human voluntarism may simply decide to act otherwise. But the occurrence of one deviation from theoretical predictions should not falsify the theory; a real and big challenge for the theory would be that the deviation is sustained over an extended period of time. As the historical overview noted, as early as August 2002, Chen Shui-bian reversed course and chose instead a hard-line approach with high sovereignty assertiveness. Put differently, structural constraints trumped individual leadership.

Finally, how does the theory fare against the unfolding story of the Ma Ying-jeou era? The new security environment confronted by the Ma administration is characterized by a mixture of negative and positive developments. As Beijing prefers to retain the use of force as one option against Taiwan despite the ongoing rapprochement, the cross-strait military balance continues to shift in favor of the PLA and the PLA’s coercive means become more varied and credible. Although Beijing’s public statements toned down the military threats and its other emerging interests increasingly compete for resources and attention, there has been no clear sign so far that Beijing is easing the military pressures upon Taiwan. Nevertheless, there are also positive developments for Taipei. US–Taiwan mutual trust has been restored and the improvements of bilateral relationship led President Ma to claim that it is the best it has been in 30 years. The United States also reaffirmed that “maintaining a robust and multidimensional unofficial relationship with Taiwan” is an important part of its rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific. In less than two years, the Obama administration has sold Taiwan defense articles and services totaling more than $12 billion, including the upgrade of Taiwan’s fleet of 145 F-16 A/B jet aircraft. Despite the failure to meet Taiwan’s request for 66 newer F-16 C/Ds, former American Institute in Taiwan chairman Richard Bush believed that the upgrading decision “constitutes a real contribution to Taiwan’s security and underscores the US commitment to Taiwan.”

Moreover, Taiwan’s international space has been expanded, if only to a limited extent. The limited expansion of Taiwan’s international space is reflected in several aspects: It managed to preserve the number of its formal diplomatic allies at 23 with a tacit understanding of “diplomatic truce” with Beijing; it has participated in the UN-affiliated World Health Assembly as an official observer for the past three years; former Vice President Lien Chan became the highest-level Taiwanese official to attend the APEC from 2008 to 2010; Taipei substantially expanded its membership in visa waiver programs around the world by increasing the number from 53 to 124. Taipei also continues to vigorously pursue free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries: It signed an investment protection accord with Japan in September 2011, is negotiating an FTA with Singapore, and is conducting feasibility studies for possible FTAs with India and the Philippines. On balance, the expanding international space and improved US–Taiwan relationship have ameliorated the deteriorating military balance across the strait.

In addition, the Ma Ying-jeou administration has faced some resource constraints. The global financial crisis and the havoc wreaked by the 2009 Typhoon Morakot in Southern Taiwan probably explained why the government failed to consistently raise its defense budget to the promised three percent of Taiwan’s gross domestic product. On the other hand, President Ma has had a relatively freer hand in resource mobilization due to weak political constraints. He won the 2008 presidential victory with
an unprecedented wide margin – 58 percent versus 42 percent for the DPP candidate, which came on the heels of the KMT’s sweeping victory in the legislative election by grabbing 81 out of the total 113 seats. With the assumption by Ma of the KMT chairmanship in 2009, it is fair to say that Ma’s political stature has been unrivaled for a while and he can more easily pursue his preferred policies to ensure Taiwan’s survival and security.

To summarize the Ma Ying-jeou era, improved US–Taiwan relations, expanded international space and weak political constraints are sustaining the conciliatory approach of low sovereignty assertiveness, but shifting military balance and resource constraints cast a shadow on the long-term prospect of the still fragile cross-strait rapprochement. On January 14, 2012, Taiwan had its fifth fully democratic presidential election and a concurrent legislative election, and Ma successfully won his second term and the KMT was able to pull off a majority in the legislature. Albeit President Ma and the KMT both received reduced mandate in light of the much narrower margins of victory, in all likelihood, the current rapprochement will continue provided that no dramatic changes take place in the realm of power balance or domestic constraints. Additionally, Beijing’s hasty push for political talks may also prompt Taipei to assert its sovereignty lest it holds an unacceptably disadvantageous position at the negotiation table.

Conclusion: Qualifications and Implications

The above congruence test does lend substantial support to my theory, and the natural next step is to use process tracing to better specify the causal mechanisms. It is also acknowledged that the covariance is not perfect and deviation from the theory’s predictions did occur, such as the moderate policies adopted during Chen Shui-bian’s initial years in office. As noted earlier, Chen’s personal political leadership was instrumental in taking a series of somewhat surprising initiatives characterized by low sovereignty assertiveness. More generally, I readily admit that I am not offering a monocausal argument here and many other factors are also important in understanding the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy, such as electoral politics, shifting identity, party ideology, etc. But I do argue that the proposed theory focusing on power shift and domestic constraints provides the greatest theoretical purchase on Taiwan’s sovereignty assertiveness in a deductively consistent way. Moreover, it is also plausible that these other factors are themselves secondary and their effects can at least be partially explained by elements of power shift. For example, the PLA’s growing military threats might explain why being assertive on sovereignty is sometimes electorally beneficial; likewise, Taiwan’s deteriorating diplomatic standing seems to be quite closely associated with Taiwanese shifting identity.

Given all the uniqueness about Taiwan, it is arguably harder for the findings to travel very far. Still there are some theoretical implications. First, international relations literature has abundant work on balance of power and balancing strategies, but Taiwan’s sovereignty assertions have indicated that balancing, under certain circumstances, can take a political face. In addition to hard and soft balancing, the study of Taiwan’s behaviors suggests that there is “political balancing” too. Moreover, different balancing
strategies are interactive: When more orthodox means are not readily available or are beyond reach due to external and internal constraints, political leaders are more incentivized to turn to unorthodox ones. Second, the findings also demonstrate that international norms do matter in political leaders’ strategic calculations. This is especially true if a norm is as undisputed and universally enshrined as sovereignty and its associated rules. The operation of international norms is not as visible as military buildup, economic sanctions, or diplomatic maneuvering, but the fact that all have taken pains to frame Taiwan’s sovereignty issue in its own favor can only be explained by its normative significance.

The findings also have policy implications. Most significantly, for all three sides – Beijing, Washington, and Taipei – the best policy is an always delicate and sometimes difficult balancing act. Beijing tends to believe that if outdone militarily, economically, and diplomatically and left with no other alternatives, Taipei could only choose to accept unification under “one country, two systems.” It is possible. But it may well be the contrary. Instead of conceding in the face of Beijing’s formidable coercive power, alienated US–Taiwan relations, and deteriorating diplomatic standing, Taipei may decide to assert its separate and independent sovereignty as one last hope. In addition, Beijing also seems to prefer to deal with the KMT government and avoid the DPP out of the belief that the former is more Beijing-friendly and less sovereignty-assertive. But my work shows that partisan preferences on sovereignty may matter less than the external and internal constraints facing Taiwan’s leaders. For Washington, there is a similar lesson. The US government has been careful not to give the impression that Taipei has a “blank check” or unconditional support from Washington to discourage Taipei from taking politically provocative actions. But waning support from Washington and a desperate Taipei might just lead to that. For Taipei, too, it has to strike a balance between the effectiveness and provocativeness of its balancing strategies, be them military, diplomatic, or political. Too much is as counterproductive and harmful to its security interests as is too little.

NOTES
3. This way I avoid the often inconclusive and fruitless debates on whether the intention behind a particular political move is de jure Taiwan independence or not. Different parties to the Taiwan issue sometimes have very different interpretations. The most expansive interpretation of Taiwan independence is that of Beijing’s. In the white paper on the Taiwan issue released in February 2000 by the Taiwan Affairs Office,
political reform, seeking more international space, weaponry purchase from the United States, and fostering a Taiwanese identity are all indices of the Taiwan independence policy. See the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC, The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, 2000. The definition adopted here is relatively narrower, as it focuses on the political dimension and excludes the military and cultural ones. Richard Bush argued that what Lee Teng-hui had said and done during his presidency did not fully justify the claim that he was a “separatist.” Even President Chen Shui-bian exhibited considerable flexibility and open-mindedness on the cross-strait relations, which was not given credit for by Beijing. See Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), pp. 35–80. For a radical account that denied the existence of a “Taiwan independence plot,” see Edward Friedman, “Taiwan’s Independence Plot,” Issues and Studies Vol. 42, No. 4 (December 2006), pp. 67–95. Friedman maintained that the so-called “Taiwan independence plot” was a constructed narrative by the Chinese Communist Party due to its regime interests and quest for regional domination but nevertheless falsely adopted by many independent observers and analysts.


7. Academia Historica, Yi Ge Zhongguo Lunshu Shiliao, p. 58.


10. The “three links” are direct postal, trade, and transportation linkages between mainland China and Taiwan, which were severed ever since 1949. To establish the “three links” has long been the PRC’s goal since the late 1970s. The “three mini-links” are “mini” because they only apply to the two offshore islands.

11. Academia Historica, Yi Ge Zhongguo Lunshu Shiliao.


13. If one casts a wider net, there are, of course, many more studies related to Taiwan’s external relations. Most works on China’s foreign relations will have relevant sections on the issue of Taiwan. For example, see David L. Shambaugh, Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010). There are also some comparative studies on themes such as globalization and unrecognized states that include the Taiwan case; for example, see Richard Baum, “The Taiwan–China Tangle: Divided Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization,” in Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., No More States? Globalization, National Self-Determination, and Terrorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp. 247–278; Nina Caspersen, Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System (Malden, MA: Polity, 2012). Some may believe that literature on separatist movements in other countries is also relevant, but the Taiwan case is fundamentally different in that it is not really a “separatist” movement given its de facto autonomy. There are also some very good works on Taiwan’s security and foreign policies, although they do not necessarily address the Taiwan independence policy per se. See Swaine and Mulvenon, Taiwan’s Foreign and Defense Policies; Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principle to Pragmatism (New York: Routledge, 2007); Michael Chase, Taiwan’s Security Policy: External Threats and Domestic Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008); Scott L. Kastner, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009). On the other hand, Taiwanese scholars are keener on developing theoretically informed works on cross-strait relations. For two good volumes, see Tzong-ho Bau and Yu-shan Wu, eds., Zhengbianzhong de Liangan Guanxi Lilun [Revisiting Theories on Cross-Strait Relations] (Taipei, Taiwan: Wu-nan, 2009); Tzong-ho Bau and Yu-shan Wu, eds., Chongxin Jianshi Zhengbianzhong de Liangan Guanxi Lilun [Contending Approaches to Cross-Strait Relations] (Taipei, Taiwan: Wu-nan, 2001); Tzong-ho Bau and Yu-shan Wu, eds., Chongxin Jianshi Zhengbianzhong de Liangan Guanxi Lilun [Documentary Collection on Cross-Strait Relations] (Taipei, Taiwan: Wu-nan, 2009).


22. Advocates of the electoral politics approach could argue that the inconsistency resulted from the rise of Taiwanese identity and change of policy preferences of the electorate. For example, Wu argued that during the 2004 presidential campaign, different political parties still converged toward the middle, but it was just that the “middle” shifted in the direction of Taiwan independence. Yu-shan Wu, “Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations.” *China Journal* No. 53 (2005), pp. 35–60. But it was not entirely clear that the Taiwanese electorate’s public opinion changed dramatically from 2000 to 2004. The next section will address the shifting identity thesis.


26. deLisle, “Taiwan’s Democracy and Lessons from Yet Another Election.”


30. In fact, in the last few years, Chinese leaders have also been careful to differentiate between Taiwanese consciousness and Taiwan independence policy. For example, in a major speech in December 2008, President Hu
Jintao emphasized that “the Taiwan consciousness, which shows the love of our Taiwan compatriots for their home and land, does not equal to ‘Taiwan independence’ consciousness.” Hu Jintao, “Let Us Join Hands to Promote the Peaceful Development of Cross-Straits Relations and Strive with a United Resolve for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation,” speech at the Forum Marking the 30th Anniversary of the Issuance of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” Beijing, December 31, 2008. Available at http://www.govt.gov.cn/en/Special/Hu/201103/t20110322_1794707.htm


33. In fact, there are more commonalities among different political parties in regard to Taiwan’s political status and external relations than are usually recognized. For example, Taiwan specialist Shelley Rigger listed five common principles of Taiwan’s external relations that most political parties adhere to: avoid entrapment by or provoking the PRC, maintain good relations with the United States, and maintain and strengthen the ROC’s formal diplomatic relations as well as substantive relations with other countries. Shelley Rigger, “Party Politics and Taiwan’s External Relations,” Orbis Vol. 49, No. 3 (2005), pp. 413–428. See also, Swaine and Mulvenon, Taiwan’s Foreign and Defense Policies; Gunter Shubert, “Taiwan’s Political Parties and National Identity: The Rise of an Overarching Consensus,” Asian Survey Vol. 44, No. 4 (2004), pp. 534–554. That these commonalities are often neglected is partially attributed to political rhetoric that stresses or exaggerates differences and accuses others of selling out Taiwan or dragging Taiwan into disastrous wars. Also it is undeniable that there are genuine differences as to tactically how best to achieve those commonly held goals.


38. In fact, throughout history, sovereignty and its associated principles such as nonintervention and domestic autonomy have been routinely violated, so much so that Stephen Krasner famously characterized sovereignty as an “organized hypocrisy,” meaning that it is an enduring but violable international norm. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). But on the other hand, a fact remains that since 1945, there has been only one case of the death of a sovereign state—North Vietnam’s conquest of South Vietnam in 1975. Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns, p. 137. On state deaths, see also Tanisha M. Fazal, “State Death in the International System,” International Organization Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring 2004), pp. 311–344.


44. For more discussion in this regard, see Bush, Untying the Knot; deLisle, “The China–Taiwan Relationship.”

45. Personal interview with former ROC official at the President’s Office, October 2008.


48. Taiwan tried twice in the 1970s and 1980s to develop nuclear weapons but eventually gave up under strong US pressure.
49. The 2000 “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” stated that “if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries . . .,” “the Chinese government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force . . .” see The Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC, The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.
50. This is not to deny that different means may be more or less effective under certain specific circumstances.
51. In economic terms, the push for each means should ideally stop when the marginal returns (of effectiveness) equal the marginal costs (of provocativeness).
52. During my interview in Taipei, Taiwan, in June 2009, one former senior official from the Mainland Affairs Council used “political security dilemma” to describe the vicious cycle across the Taiwan Strait during the Chen Shui-bian era. Likewise, Richard Bush’s characterization of the pre-Ma Ying-jesou era is close to a “security dilemma” in a political sense, although he did not use the term. In Richard Bush’s words, “each side feared that the other was going to challenge its fundamental interests. Beijing worried that Taipei would close the door on its goal of unification. Taipei feared that Beijing would constrain it to the point that negotiations on China’s terms would become inevitable. Each side took measures to protect its interests . . .” Richard C. Bush, “Taiwan and East Asian Security,” Orbis Vol. 55, No. 2 (2011), p. 274.
55. Taiwan, of course, has no formal alliances after 1979, and the term “alliance strength” simply refers to US–Taiwan relations (security commitment, arms sales, and political relations).
56. A rigorous analysis of any of the three dimensions is beyond the scope of this article. Rather, the following discussion will draw on existing studies for illustrative purpose.
58. For excellent accounts of US–China relations and the US Taiwan policy during this period, see relevant sections of Jim Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999); Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen; Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States–Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
60. For an overview of Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy during this period, see Maysing H. Yang, ed., Taiwan’s Expanding Role in the International Arena (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997).

63. For a detailed account of Lee Teng-hui’s rise to power by a journalist close to him, see Jing-wen Zou, *Lee Teng-hui Zhibeng Gaobai Shilu* [The Truth-Telling Records of Lee Teng-hui’s Rule] (Taipei, Taiwan: INK, 2001).

64. Some KMT conservatives did harbor reservations about Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy on the ground that it would create “two Chinas,” but the influence was not significant.


68. For an excellent account of the evolution of the US–Japan alliance during this period, see Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).


70. The “three no’s” are: no support for Taiwan independence, no support for two Chinas or one China–one Taiwan, and no support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations for which statehood is a prerequisite.


Liu, Lishi de jiujie, p. 23. “Taiwan’s Nixon” means that Chen Shui-bian, from a political party which has openly advocated Taiwan independence, might nevertheless open dialogue with Beijing and even set foot on the mainland’s soil, just as President Nixon did in his historic 1972 trip to China despite his strong anti-Communist credentials.


For discussions of the PLA’s missions other than Taiwan, see Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, Beyond the Strait (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009); Michael A. Glosny, “Deeper Cross-Strait Rapprochement and PLA Modernization: Implications for China’s Relations with Asia and the United States,” in Roger Cliff, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott Harold, eds., New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan’s Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), pp. 109–125.


Economic diplomacy is subsumed under pragmatic diplomacy, as the former is one instrument of the latter.

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